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ABSTRACT 
Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential 
justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that 
seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most general 
and developed view to this effect is Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential 
seemings (ToIS). Moretti (2018) has shown that PC is affected by the problem of 
reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper 
I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem and it is thus 
hostage to inferential scepticism. I also suggest a possible response on behalf of 
ToIS’s advocates. 
KEYWORDS Inferential justification; inferential seemings; phenomenal 
conservatism; reflective awareness; entitlement theory; Michael Huemer.    
1. Introduction 
Huemer (2001, 2007) has defended an internalist theory of non-inferential justification, 
nowadays very popular, called phenomenal conservatism (PC). Other epistemologists –
– prominently, Pryor (2000, 2004) –– have supported similar views. According to PC, a 
subject S’s seeming or appearance that P gives S defeasible, non-inferential 
justification for believing P. Some epistemologists –– for instance Chudnoff (2014), 
Brogaard (2016) and Huemer (2016) –– argue that appearances are also required to 
explain internalist inferential justification. The most developed of these views is 
Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). According to it, S’s having 
inferential justification for Q from P requires S to entertain an inferential appearance 
that represents Q as being true or probably true in light of P. In Moretti (2018) I have 
argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes 
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seeming-based non-inferential justification elusive and targetable by sceptical 
arguments. In this paper, I show that, despite its merits, ToIS is afflicted by a variant of 
this problem and it is thus hostage to a form of inferential scepticism. I explore possible 
strategies of response available to ToIS’s advocates and I suggest that they might be 
able to resolve this problem if they combined ToIS with some version of epistemic 
entitlement theory.    
In more detail, §2 outlines PC and the problem of reflective awareness. §3 
introduces ToIS. §4 argues that ToIS is affected by the problem of reflective awareness. 
§5 contends that ToIS is open to a sceptical challenge. §6 outlines and appraises 
possible responses by ToIS’s advocates. §7 concludes the paper. 
2. PC, scepticism and the problem of reflective awareness 
The claim that we have epistemic justification for believing many things just because of 
the ways things appear to us to be looks plausible. For instance, it looks plausible that I 
can have justification for believing that this is a hand just because it seems visually so to 
me. It looks plausible that I have a reason for believing that 1 = 1 just because it seems a 
priori true to me. PC accounts for the justifying force of seemings by this principle:1 
 
(JS) If it seems to S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has 
justification sufficient to believe P.2,3 
                                                            
1 For more detailed introductions to PC, see Tucker (2013), Moretti (2015) and Huemer (2018). 
2 JS has been introduced in Huemer (2001) and it is the principle actually at stake in most 
conversation about PC. Huemer (2007) defends a variant of JS according to which if it 
seems to S that P, in the absence of defeaters S has at least some degree of justification for 
believing P. Huemer fears that a weak and wavering seeming that P couldn’t give S 
justification sufficient to believe P (cf. [2007, 30n1]). To get round this difficulty, 
whenever I speak of seemings or appearances, I always mean clear and firm seemings. 
3 JS concerns propositional justification but it can easily be re-formulated to apply to doxastic 
justification (see for instance Huemer [2018])   
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Seemings are conceived of by PC’s advocates as experiences provided with 
propositional content but unanalysable in terms of belief. Such experiences have an 
assertive phenomenology, described as the feeling of ascertaining that a given 
proposition is true (cf. Tolhurst [1998]; Huemer [2001, §4]; Pryor [2004]). Defeaters 
may be constituted by seemings, beliefs or other contentful mental states (cf. Huemer 
[2006, 148]). The ‘thereby’ in JS indicates that S’s justification for P is solely based on 
the seeming that P. Since it is based on no belief of S (e.g., the belief that S’s faculties 
are reliable or the reflective belief that S has a seeming that P), this justification is non-
inferential (cf. Huemer [2018]).   
PC is internalist at least in the sense of mentalist internalism, as the conditions 
that confer epistemic justification or rationality on S supervene on S’s psychological 
states –– in particular, on S’s appearances and lack of defeaters (cf. Huemer [2011]). 
Indeed, a central motivation for PC is its ability to account for internalist intuitions; for 
instance, the intuition that it cannot be the case that P is justified for S but Q is not, 
when P and Q appear to S to be exactly alike in all epistemically relevant respects (i.e., 
when P and Q appear equally plausible, the experiences supporting them appear equally 
trustworthy, and so on) (cf. Huemer [2006, 2011]). 
One reason why PC is philosophically alluring is that it applies to seemings of 
any type and thus offers a unified account of non-inferential justification for beliefs of 
all sorts.4 In this way PC plays a key role in grounding fallible foundationalism (cf. 
Huemer [2001, 102]). A celebrated virtue of PC is also its antisceptical bite. Suppose S 
experiences as if (P) the cat is on the mat. The sceptic may insist that S could acquire 
defeasible justification for believing P from her experience only if S had independent 
justification for disbelieving that, say, (SH) S’s experience is a hallucination induced by 
                                                            
4 For instance, perceptual, a priori, moral, and mnemonic beliefs (cf. Moretti [2015]). 
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the Matrix. The sceptic will contend that since S cannot have this independent 
justification, S has no justification for P. Suppose, however, that S’s experience is a 
seeming. If PC is true, S can have justification for believing P even if she lacks 
independent justification for disbelieving SH (cf. Huemer [2001]; Pryor [2000, 2004]).5 
I find PC prima facie plausible.6 In Moretti (2018) I have shown that PC’s 
antisceptical bite is significantly limited by the problem of reflective awareness. Let’s 
tell apart ‘S’s having a seeming that P’ and ‘S’s being reflectively aware of a seeming 
that P’. The first expression refers to a mental state of S –– a seeming that P –– which 
could exist even if S didn’t reflect on her experiences. The second refers to a more 
complex state encompassing at least: (i) S’s seeming that P, (ii) S’s reflective 
acquaintance with her seeming, and (iii) S’s reflective belief obtained through 
acquaintance that she has that seeming. Suppose S has non-inferential justification for 
believing P from her seeming that P. The problem of reflective awareness is this: if S 
becomes reflectively aware of her seeming and realizes that its existence can potentially 
be explained by hypotheses incompatible with P, S’s seaming-based justification for P 
will be either simply defeated or replaced with inferential justification for P that 
requires S to have independent justification for disbelieving the error hypotheses. 
For instance, imagine S has a seeming that (P) the cat is on the mat, and no 
defeater. If JS is correct, S will thereby possess non-inferential justification for 
believing P. Suppose that at a time t, S then becomes reflectively aware of her seeming. 
Before t, S didn’t have the belief that she had that seeming. S was thus unable to wonder 
whether the seeming was veridical. At t S can pose this question. Imagine S does so. 
She will find alternative explanations of why she has that seeming: it might be the result 
of her actually perceiving that P, or an illusion or hallucination produced by a clever 
                                                            
5 For other asserted virtues of PC see Tucker (2013). 
6 PC has been targeted by various arguments but it is dubious it has been lethally struck. For 
objections and responses see Tucker (2013), Moretti (2015) and Huemer (2018). 
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camouflage, a hallucinogenic inadvertently consumed, the Matrix, and so on. S will 
realize that her seeming that P might result from various states of affairs that falsify P. 
In these circumstances, if S lacks independent justification for ruling out some of these 
possible explanations incompatible with P as false or improbable, S can no longer 
rationally believe P. S’s justification for believing P will thus be destroyed.7 
Alternatively, if S finds independent justification for ruling out all these error 
conjectures, her non-inferential justification for P will be supplanted by inferential 
justification. For example, imagine S has statistical evidence that each error conjecture 
                                                            
7 A referee of this journal suggests that PC’s advocates might try to reject this claim by 
insisting that: 
 
(*) S’s conceiving of a deceptive scenario SH incompatible with P need not defeat S’s 
justification for P, unless S has reason to think that SH obtains or is likely to obtain. 
 
If (*) is correct, even if S lacked independent justification for taking SH to be false or 
improbable, S could still have justification for believing P. The referee helpfully indicates 
that a general problem of (*) is that it enables bootstrapping reasoning, which is 
counterintuitive. In short, once S acquires justification for believing P and competently 
deduces Not-SH from P, S will acquire justification for believing Not-SH, and thus 
disbelieving SH. This appears to be a too easy way to earn justification for ruling out SH. 
(I return to bootstrapping in §6.) Another problem of (*) is that it has elementary 
counterexamples. Suppose S conceived of a deceptive scenario SH incompatible with P 
and found equal reasons for SH and Not-SH. (Imagine that S found out that SH and Not-
SH have equal chance to obtain.) It is intuitive that S’s appearance-based justification for 
believing P would normally be defeated in these circumstances, though S wouldn’t have 
reason to think that SH obtains or is likely to obtain (cf. Wright [2007, 41]; Pryor [2018, 
139]). Irrespective of these considerations, (*) appears false if one considers carefully the 
predicament of S in the thought experiments illustrating the problem of reflective 
awareness. When S comes to entertain the belief that she has a seeming that P and 
conceives of an array of alternative and incompatible explanations of her seeming, S could 
rationally believe one of these explanations only if she had independent reasons to 
disbelieve all the others. S’s selecting one specific explanation without possessing such 
reasons would be arbitrary. This looks straightforward. Consequently, S could justifiedly 
believe the specific explanation according to which she perceives that P (and so she could 
justifiedly believe P) only if she had independent justification for taking the other error 
explanations to be false or improbable. 
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is extremely unlikely. Or suppose S realizes that all error conjectures are exceedingly 
complicated and far-fetched, and that this constitutes evidence that they are all very 
unlikely. In either case, by adducing her justified beliefs about the low probability of the 
error conjectures, S may be able to justifiedly conclude via reasoning that P is true or 
probably true. S’s non-inferential justification for believing P will in this case be 
replaced by inferential justification. Furthermore, this inferential justification will 
require S to possess independent justification for disbelieving all error conjectures. 
Now consider again a sceptical argument that assumes that S must have 
independent justification for ruling out any relevant error conjecture in order to acquire 
justification from her experience, and that concludes that S cannot acquire justification 
from experience because she cannot have that independent justification. In the face of 
this argument, if PC is true and experiences are appearances, ordinary people 
unaccustomed to reflecting on their experiences and subjects incapable of doing so 
(e.g., small children) will normally possess experience-based justification. For, if PC is 
true, possessing this justification doesn’t depend on having independent justification for 
ruling out error conjectures. Nevertheless, PC won’t benefit reflective subjects (e.g., 
epistemologists) who engage with sceptical arguments of the type described above in 
the attempt to refute them (cf. Moretti 2018). Suppose S aimed at refuting an argument 
stating that since S’s appearance as if P might result from the truth of a conjecture SH 
incompatible with P, S could acquire justification for P only if she had independent 
justification for disbelieving SH. S could actually engage with this argument only if she 
grasped the way in which it applies to her epistemic circumstances –– so, only if S were 
reflectively aware of her seeming that P and realized that SH is a potential explanation 
of it. Once these two conditions were fulfilled, despite PC, S could have justification for 
believing P only if she had independent justification for disbelieving SH, which is what 
the sceptic contends. 
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3. Huemer’s ToIS 
Huemer (2016)8 distinguishes between fully explicit inference and inference against 
background. Suppose S infers P from E (where E can be a conjunction of propositions). 
What differentiates these two kinds of inferences is this: in the first case S needs no 
(non-logical) background information to draw the inference and attain justification for 
P; in the second, S needs some background information to make the inference and attain 
justification for P (cf. [2016, 144]). 
For example, suppose S justifiedly believes that (E) it is false that both a tiger 
and a cow are on the couch, and that from this S justifiedly infers that (P) there is no 
tiger or no cow on the couch. S will need some background to understand E and P. But 
S’s ability to perform the inference and S’s justification for P don’t require any (non-
logical) background. Thus, this counts as a fully explicit inference. Alternatively, 
imagine S returns home and sees that the couch’s fabric is shredded. From her justified 
belief that (E) the cat has been home all the time and the couch’s fabric has become 
shredded, S justifiedly infers that (P) the cat has shredded the fabric. S’s ability to run 
this inference and her justification for P require a host of background beliefs (which 
needn’t be occurrent in S’s mind). S needs to believe, for instance, that the cat has sharp 
claws and fabric doesn’t spontaneously become shredded. This is an inference against 
background (cf. [2016, 144]). 
ToIS accounts for inferential justification resting on, indifferently, fully explicit 
inferences or inferences against background, where these inferences can be deductive or 
non-deductive. Justification is meant to be doxastic, which requires S to believe both E 
and P, and consciously infer P from E (cf. [2016, 144-145]). A key assumption of ToIS 
is that S’s acquiring an inferentially justified belief that P from another justified belief 
                                                            
8 ToIS was already presupposed in some of Huemer’s earlier work –– for instance, Huemer 
(2001, 112-113, 2007, 30n1).   
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that E requires S to have an appearance –– called inferential seeming –– which 
represents P as being true or probably true given or in light of E9 (cf. [2016, 153]). ToIS 
rests on the same internalist intuition that underlies PC, according to which there is an 
essential link between what is epistemically justified or rational for S and her 
psychological states. The latter states include in this case S’s inferential appearances (cf. 
Huemer [2013, 339]).  
Let me first outline ToIS’s account of inferential justification resting on fully 
explicit inference. It says that S’s belief that P is inferentially justified to some degree 
just in case there is a proposition E such that: 
 
(1) S’s belief that E is justified to some degree; 
(2) S has an inferential seeming that, in light of E, P is true or probably true; 
(3) S’s justification for E doesn’t depend on S’s having justification for P; 
(4) S lacks (robust) defeaters for P; 
(5) S’s belief that E causes S’s belief that P via S’s inferential seeming and 
by a non-deviant causal chain. (Cf. [2016, 150]) 
 
Although this account concerns degrees of justification, I take it to entail the following 
about plain justification: S’s belief that P is inferentially justified if and only if S’s 
belief that E is justified and (2)-(5) are satisfied. 
(1), (3) and (4) are obviously required. (1) looks basic. (3) rules out question-
begging inferences. (4) is needed because S would lack inferential justification for P if S 
had a defeater of that justification.10 
                                                            
9 An inferential seeming doesn’t merely represent that E and P stand in a certain logical or 
epistemic relation to one other. Huemer fears that a seeming of this type would engender a 
variant of Lewis Carroll’s infinite regress problem (cf. [2016, 146-147, 152-153]). For 
Huemer, an inferential seeming is rather one that represents that P is true or probable 
under the assumption that E is true (cf. [2016: 149-150]).  
10 A robust defeater is one capable of making P completely unjustified (cf. [2016, 151]). If we 
focus on plain justification rather than degrees of it, the qualification ‘robust’ is irrelevant. 
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 Conditions (2) and (5) call for elucidation. Huemer endorses the principle –– 
widespread among internalists –– that S can acquire an inferentially justified belief that 
P from another belief that E of her only if (a) S sees (in some relevant sense)11 that E 
supports P (i.e., that E makes P true or probable) and (b) S infers P from E through 
seeing that E supports P. Condition (2) fleshes out the requirement (a) by interpreting ‘S 
sees that…’ as ‘S has an inferential seeming that…’ (cf. [2016, 150-151, 2013, 338]). 
One could criticize Huemer’s interpretation of ‘S sees that…’ by highlighting 
that S might mistakenly happen to have a seeming that E supports P when E does not 
support P. Huemer dismisses this criticism observing that it rests on the questionable 
assumption that S’s having an inferentially justified belief that P from a belief that E 
requires E to actually support P. He contends –– plausibly, in my opinion –– that from 
an internalist viewpoint, S’s inferentially justified belief doesn’t require actual support. 
Consider a skilled but unfortunate mathematician who has carefully completed an 
apparent proof that P from premise E by making an undetected, subtle mistake. Since E 
appears to entail P to the mathematician, and she finds no reason whatsoever to think of 
the contrary, the mathematician is inferentially justified in believing P. It would be 
irrational for her not to believe P in these circumstances (cf. [2016, 147-148, 2013, 
339]). 
 Condition (5) fleshes out the internalist constraint on inferentially justified belief 
according to which (b) S must infer P from E through her seeing that E supports P. 
Accordingly, (5) requires that S’s belief that E must cause S’s belief that P –– in a non-
deviant way12 –– via S’s seeming that E supports P (cf. [2016, 151-152, 2013, 338]).  
                                                            
11 I follow Huemer (2016) in taking the verb to see not to be necessarily factive in this context.   
12 It is notoriously difficult to give a characterization of a deviant causal link. Huemer provides 
this example: S justifiedly believes E and sees that E supports P, but she refuses to believe 
P because this makes her unhappy. Nevertheless, an epistemically benevolent brain 
scientist detects S’s justified belief that E and S’s inferential appearance. And this 
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Let’s turn to ToIS’s account of inferential justification resting on inference 
against background. Suppose S infers P from E against background information B. On 
Huemer’s account, S will entertain a seeming that E supports P. How does B come into 
this picture? It is implausible that S’s seeming could represent P as true or probably true 
given E and B. For the information stored in one’s background information doesn’t 
normally become occurrent in one’s mind either in the form of belief or in the form of 
appearance (cf. [2016, 157]). ToIS explains the epistemic relevance of B as follows: the 
truth or probability referred to in S’s inferential seeming is relativized to B in the same 
sense in which confirmation theorists say that the probability of a proposition given 
evidence is conditioned on background information (cf. [2016, 157-158]). But how can 
S’s seeming include reference to B if S isn’t conscious of B? Firstly, S’s seeming is 
generated by brain processes shaped by B. Furthermore, S will be disposed, if the issue 
arises, to acknowledge the relevance of B to her appearance’s content (cf. [2016, 158]). 
ToIS’s account of inferential justification resting on inference against 
background comes in terms of conditions (1)-(5) with (2) is supplanted by: 
 
(2B)  S has an inferential seeming that, in light of E, P is true or probably 
true relative to B. 
 
This summary has hopefully shown that ToIS is interesting and prima facie 
plausible or promising. To complete my presentation, let me contrast ToIS with 
Fumerton’s rival theory. Fumerton (1995, 36, 85-94, 187-224) also adopts an internalist 
approach to justification and maintains that S is inferentially justified in believing P on 
the basis of E13 only if: (1*) S is justified in believing E and (2*) S is justified in 
believing that E makes P true or probable because, among other things, (3*) S is 
                                                                                                                                                                              
detection causes the scientist to use a brain-manipulation tool to induce in S a belief that P. 
Clearly, S’s belief that P isn’t in this case inferential. 
13 Where E includes everything that S takes to be relevant to P’s truth. 
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acquainted with the logical probability of P given E. Fumerton endorses classical 
acquaintance theory according to which S is acquainted with a fact when it is 
immediately before S’s consciousness. He thinks of logical probability in Keynesian 
terms, as a sui generis abstract relation between propositions (where entailment is the 
upper limit of making probable). Fumerton (2015) concedes that (2*) may be dropped. 
ToIS and Fumerton’s thus essentially diverge because of (3*). Whereas Huemer 
interprets the internalist requirement for inferential justification that S must see that E 
supports P as stating that S must have a seeming that E supports P, Fumerton interprets 
it as saying that S must be acquainted with the (high) logical probability of P given E. 
An advantage of ToIS over Fumerton’s theory is that it doesn’t rest on the 
controversial thesis that there exist logical probabilities. S’s inferential seeming 
represents P as true or probably true given E, but ‘probably true’ need not be 
interpreted as referring just to logical probability –– any interpretation of it suitable to 
flesh out the intuition that S sees that E supports P would do (cf. Huemer [2016, 154-
155, 159]). In addition, note that acquaintance is factive –– S cannot be acquainted with 
the fact that P’s logical probability given E is high unless this probability is actually so 
–– whereas appearance can be non-veridical –– S can have the appearance that E 
supports P when it doesn’t. So Fumerton’s theory cannot explain the cases in which S 
has an inferentially justified belief that P from another belief that E, though E doesn’t 
really support P. (Recall the case of the unfortunate mathematician.) ToIS doesn’t have 
this problem (cf. [2016, 155-156]). 
4. Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness  
Once inferential seemings are called on, a version of the problem of reflective 
awareness surfaces. Imagine that S has a justified belief that E, an inferential seeming 
that E supports P (perhaps relative to some background B), and no reason for 
disbelieving P or distrusting her seeming. If S comes to believe P because of her 
 12 
justified belief that E via her seeming that E supports P, S’s belief that P will be 
inferentially justified. Nevertheless, if S becomes reflectively aware of her seeming that 
E supports P and realizes that its existence can potentially be explained by conjectures 
incompatible with the truthfulness of the seeming, the justification of her belief that P 
will be either destroyed or supplanted by new inferential justification requiring S to 
have independent justification for believing that her seeming is trustworthy. 
Let me illustrate this with an example. Suppose S justifiedly entertains a belief 
that (E) it is false that both a tiger and a cow are on the couch. Furthermore, imagine 
that S has an inferential seeming that given E it is true that (P) there is no tiger or no 
cow on the couch, and no evidence for disbelieving P or distrusting her seeming. Since 
S comes to believe P because of E and through her seeming that P is true given E, S’s 
belief that P is inferentially justified. However, suppose that at a time t S becomes 
reflectively aware of her inferential seeming. Accordingly, S will entertain a reflective 
belief that she has a seeming that P is true given E. Before t S didn’t have this belief, so 
S was incapable of wondering whether her appearance was veridical or deceptive. But at 
t, S can ask herself this question. Imagine S does so. She will find various possible 
responses: that appearance might result from her actual ascertaining that P is true given 
E through some analytic or intuitive faculty she is endowed with. Alternatively, the 
seeming might be a deceptive representation produced by, for instance, S’s sheer 
tiredness, a cognitive impairment of S caused by an incipient mental disorder, a 
Cartesian demon,14 and so on. After t S will thus realize that her seeming that P is true 
in light of E can possibly be explained by hypotheses that entail that it is false that P is 
true in light of E. 
                                                            
14 In his First Meditation Descartes introduces the conjecture of a deceiving God, then 
reformulated as the demon conjecture, which raises the possibility that we might 
constantly be deceived in our elementary arithmetical reasoning. It is easy to extend this 
conjecture to threaten all our elementary inferences.  
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Suppose S found no justification for ruling out as false or improbable some of 
the error explanations she has conceived of. Without this independent justification, S 
couldn’t rationally believe the hypothesis that her inferential seeming results from her 
actually ascertaining that P is true in light of E. Thus, despite her justified belief that E 
and her seeming that E supports P, S couldn’t justifiedly believe P.15     
Alternatively, suppose S found justification for ruling out any of these error 
hypotheses and concluding that her inferential seeming is veridical or trustworthy. In 
this case S’s belief that P would still be inferentially justified. However, now the 
inferential justification of S’s belief that P would depend on both S’s original justified 
belief that E and S’s independently justified belief that her seeming is veridical. 
I have considered a fully explicit inference relying on a deductive seeming, but 
my example can be recast using inferences of other types. For instance, take again S’s 
abductive inference against background going from  
(E) The cat has been home all the time and the couch’s fabric has become 
shredded 
to 
(P) The cat has shredded the fabric. 
Suppose that S justifiedly believes E, has an inferential –– abductive –– seeming 
that P is probably true given E relative to background B,16 and no reason to disbelieve 
P or doubt the truthfulness of her seeming. Suppose S thereby believes P. S’s belief will 
                                                            
15 A referee of this journal suggests that advocates of ToIS might respond that in order to 
rationally believe P, S need not have independent justification for ruling out the error 
conjectures she has conceived of, at least so long as S doesn’t have a seeming that an error 
conjecture is likely. I find this possible response misguided. In the circumstances I’ve 
described, S can rationally believe P on the basis of E only if she has an epistemic reason 
to prefer the hypothesis that her inferential seeming is veridical to any alternative error 
hypothesis she has conceived of. To do so, S does need independent justification for ruling 
out all these alternatives. 
16 Hereafter, I leave reference to B implicit. 
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be inferentially justified. Imagine that at a time t, S then acquires a reflective belief that 
she has that inferential seeming. S will be able to wonder whether the seeming is 
trustworthy or not. If S does so, S will find some possible responses: S might 
hypothesize that her seeming is trustworthy because it has been produced by a faculty 
she is endowed with that tracks the actual probability of propositions given evidence.17 
Once S has posited an explanation of this sort, S will also conceive of alternative 
explanations that imply that her seeming is deceptive. S might conjecture that the 
faculty she is supposedly endowed with is faulty on that occasion because, say, S is 
unconsciously biased against cats, S has inadvertently ingested LSD, or a Cartesian 
demon has interfered. S might also conceive of error conjectures entailing that no 
faculty like the one imagined actually exists. After t S will thus realize that her seeming 
that P is probable in light of E can possibly be explained by conjectures that entail that 
it is false that P is probable in light of E. 
Suppose S lacks justification for ruling out some of these error conjectures. S’s 
belief that P would no longer be justified. Alternatively, suppose that S finds 
justification for ruling out all these error conjectures, to conclude that her seeming is 
trustworthy. It is intuitive that in this case S’s belief that P would still be inferentially 
justified. But now the inferential justification of S’s belief that P would depend on both 
S’s original belief that E and S’s independently justified belief that her seeming that E 
supports P is trustworthy. 
                                                            
17 A controversial hypothesis, which Huemer (2016) nevertheless appears to flirt with, is that 
non-deductive inferential appearances depend on a faculty of S that tracks logical 
probabilities. ‘Probability’ could also be interpreted subjectively. In this interpretation, 
inferential seemings are not requested to track logical relations or objective chances. 
However, note that subjective probabilities must be coherent –– they must conform to the 
probability calculus. In this interpretation, inferential seemings must depend on some 
cognitive faculty that guarantees this (weak) form of objectivity. This opens the door to 
error conjectures. 
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5. Inferential scepticism and the problem of reflective awareness  
The bearing of the problem of reflective awareness on ToIS isn’t devastating. If we 
actually have inferential seemings, their justifying power is likely to remain 
unchallenged in most cases. For we don’t reflect on our mental states and speculate 
about their possible causes in normal circumstances; we engage in these activities only 
when we have reasons to do it. Consequently, the processes described in the former 
section are bound not to take place, normally, when we draw inferences. I will now 
argue that, nonetheless, because of the problem of reflective awareness, the antisceptical 
bite of ToIS is importantly limited in the same way in which PC’s is.     
Huemer (2016) thinks that ToIS can be adduced to defuse two important types 
of sceptical arguments. The arguments of the first type aim to conclude that we have no 
inferentially justified belief because any attempt to acquire it would catch us in a 
vicious infinite regress. A basic case of this type starts from the familiar assumption that 
S can have a belief that P is inferentially justified by a belief that E only if S sees that E 
supports P. This necessary condition is interpreted –– in the argument –– as one that 
requires S to have a belief that E supports P, inferentially justified by some other belief 
that E1 of S. Since this necessary condition applies to any inferentially justified belief –– 
the argument continues –– it must also apply to S’s very belief that E supports S, 
inferentially justified by E1. Therefore, S can have this inferentially justified belief only 
if S possesses a further belief that E1 supports the proposition [E supports P], 
inferentially justified by another belief that E2. But then, again, S can have the last 
inferentially justified belief only if S entertains another belief that E2 supports the 
proposition [E1 supports the proposition [E supports P]], inferentially justified by 
another belief that E3. This regress is endless. Since S cannot entertain an endless 
number of beliefs, S won’t satisfy a necessary condition for having an inferentially 
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justified belief. So –– the argument concludes –– S cannot have any inferentially 
justified belief (cf. Huemer [2016, 148]).18 
ToIS defuses arguments of this sort by rejecting the interpretation of the 
necessary condition for inferentially justified belief presupposed by the sceptic. On 
ToIS, all what S needs to have in order to see that E supports P is just a seeming that E 
supports P. This alternative reading stops the regress (cf. [2016, 153]). 
The problem of reflective awareness as such doesn’t undermine this 
antisceptical consequence of ToIS. As stressed, we seldom reflect on our inferential 
seemings and speculate about their causes. Consider nevertheless a subject S who infers 
P from E, where E is justified for S. Imagine that S happens to be reflectively aware of 
her seeming that E supports P, and that S conceives of some possible explanations of it 
entailing that the seeming is deceptive. If S cannot rule out these conjectures, S will lose 
the justification of her belief that P. But no infinite regress would necessarily start in 
this case.  
The sceptical arguments of the second type that ToIS is meant to defuse are no 
less worrying than the former arguments. Suppose S justifiedly believes E, sees that E 
supports P, and thereby believes P. These sceptical arguments maintain, again, that S’s 
belief that P cannot be inferentially justified because S cannot meet a crucial condition. 
Specifically, they say that S’s seeing that E supports P could make the required 
contribution to the inferential justification of S’s belief that P –– to the effect that this 
belief is justified –– only if S had independent justification for taking her seeing that E 
supports P to be trustworthy. These arguments conclude that since S cannot have this 
independent justification, S cannot have inferential justification for P.19 
                                                            
18 See also Fumerton (1995, 187-190).  
19 Although Huemer (2016) doesn’t explicitly state arguments of this type, the final paragraph 
of his paper indicates that he has them in mind.   
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One might try to rebut objections of this sort by insisting that S can and does 
typically possess independent justification for taking what she sees to be correct. But 
this is admittedly questionable. For it is questionable that S could justifiedly rule out all 
relevant error conjectures she might think of. Let’s distinguish between ordinary error 
conjectures and (proper) sceptical conjectures. Any ordinary error conjecture simply 
specifies that S has made a cognitive mistake that S has not detected or cannot detect in 
her current circumstances. This doesn’t entail that S couldn’t find evidence revealing 
her mistake or ruling out that she has made a mistake, if she were lucky enough or 
investigated sufficiently the issue. On the other hand, a sceptical conjecture is an error 
conjecture that specifies that S has made an undetectable cognitive error –– one that S 
couldn’t discover or rule out no matter how much or how deep S might investigate (cf. 
Klein 2008: §1). 
Consider again the ordinary error conjecture that S’s seeing that E supports P is 
a deceptive representation caused by an incipient mental disorder. S could rule out this 
conjecture by taking the negative outcome of a medical test as contrary evidence. 
However, evidence of this type will lose any significance as S turns to the sceptical 
conjecture that, say, S’s seeing that E supports P is a deceptive representation caused by 
a Cartesian demon that endeavours to make S’s deception and its own existence 
undetectable to S. It is hard to imagine the sort of evidence that S could find to rule out a 
hypothesis of this type. 
Huemer believes we can refute sceptical arguments invoking error conjectures 
of any type by responding as follows:  
 
Since we are justified in trusting our appearances unless and until we acquire 
grounds for distrusting them, we have an easy explanation of why most inferential 
beliefs are justified… It would then be the skeptic’s burden to show the appearance 
to be untrustworthy. (2016, 159) 
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In short, Huemer interprets ‘seeing that…’ as ‘having a seeming that…’ and emphasizes 
that it is false that S’s seeming that E supports P can give its crucial contribution to the 
inferential justification of S’s belief that P only if S has independent justification for 
taking her seeming to be trustworthy. The truth is that S’s seeming that E supports P 
contributes to S’s inferential justification of P by default, unless S is given reasons to 
distrust it.20  
I find this rejoinder plausible when S stands for an ordinary, unreflective 
individual who is not afflicted by sceptical misgivings. If ToIS is true, in the face of the 
sceptic, ordinary subjects, who are not accustomed to reflect on their inferential 
seemings and speculate about their causes, will normally have inferential justification. 
Despite this important result, it appears to me that the truth of ToIS cannot benefit 
reflective subjects –– perhaps epistemologists –– who engage with sceptical arguments 
of the sort just considered in the attempt to reject them. 
Imagine that S justifiedly believes E, sees that E supports P, and thereby 
believes P. Consider the following sceptical argument: since S cannot find independent 
justification for ruling out the conjecture that (SH) S’s seeing that E supports P is a 
deceptive representation induced by a Cartesian demon, S’s belief that P isn’t 
inferentially justified. Now let’s assume that ToIS is true and let’s interpret ‘sees that…’ 
as ‘has a seeming that…’ Suppose S engages with the above sceptical argument. S can 
do so only if she grasps how the objection puts her inferential justification for P at risk. 
S can do this only if she is reflectively aware of her inferential seeming that E supports 
P and appreciates that SH can possibly explain its occurrence as a case of deceptive 
representation. Once these two conditions are satisfied –– despite ToIS –– S’s belief that 
                                                            
20 In the above quotation Huemer writes that ‘we are justified in trusting our appearances’ 
unless we acquire grounds to distrust them. Huemer is speaking loosely here. For one of 
the celebrated strengths of appearances is that their justifying power doesn’t require 
justification for trusting them. Huemer must mean that our appearances have justifying 
power by default unless we have reasons to distrust them. 
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P can be inferentially justified only if S has independent justification for ruling out SH, 
which is just what the inferential sceptic contends. 
6. Possible responses by ToIS’s advocates 
Let me now outline and appraise possible lines of response that advocates of ToIS 
might be tempted to pursue.21 (Since advocates of PC might put forward very similar 
responses when pressed by the sceptic, my remarks also apply to them with minimal 
changes.) 
To begin with, supporters of ToIS might contend that S could justifiedly rule out 
all the error conjectures conceivable by S through bootstrapping or via epistemically 
circular reasoning.22 These forms of arguments assume (disputably) that S’s 
justification for ruling out the error conjectures need not be independent of S’s seemings 
but, rather, can originate from them. Suppose S has a seeming that E supports P. By 
applying bootstrapping, S would first form a belief that E supports P, non-inferentially 
justified through JS23 by her inferential seeming that E supports P. Then, S would 
deduce from this justified belief, and so would justify, the belief that SH is false, where 
SH is any error conjecture that denies that E supports P. 
By applying epistemic circular reasoning, S would first form a long series of 
conjunctive beliefs like these: 
I have a seeming that E1 supports P1 and E1 actually supports P1, 
I have a seeming that E2 supports P2 and E2 actually supports P2, 
... 
I have a seeming that Ek supports Pk and Ek actually supports Pk. 
                                                            
21 I’m grateful to a referee of this Journal for inviting me to consider this issue and suggesting 
possible responses. 
22 For general discussion about bootstrapping and epistemic circularity see for instance Cohen 
(2005, 2010), Weisberg (2012) and Lammenranta (2018). 
23 It is quite natural to presume that the advocates of ToIS would endorse PC. 
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The first conjunct of each conjunction would be justified introspectively by S’s 
reflecting on her seeming that En supports Pn, and the second conjunct would be non-
inferentially justified through JS by her seeming that En supports Pn. From this long 
series of conjunctive beliefs S would then infer and justify by induction the belief that 
her inferential seemings are generally reliable (in the sense that their contents are true 
most of the time). From it, S would further deduce and justify the belief that SH is false, 
where SH is any error conjecture that denies the reliability of S’s seemings. 
I think that neither strategy would have a good chance to succeed. It appears 
straightforward to me that one cannot establish that a given experience is accurate by 
examining only that experience and without considering independent evidence. 
Furthermore, it is intuitive that one cannot establish that experiences of a certain type 
are reliable by inspecting only a series of those experiences and without considering 
independent evidence. However, these are precisely the sorts of things that 
bootstrapping and epistemically circular reasoning would enable us to do if they were 
accepted as valid inferential patterns. Since bootstrapping and inferentially circular 
reasoning are counterintuitive (cf., White [2006], Wright [2007], Vogel [2008], Cohen 
[2005, 2010], Weisberg [2012] and Siegel and Silins [2015]),24 many if not most 
epistemologists would dismiss this line of reply as flawed or very suspect. 
Let’s turn to an alternative strategy. Advocates of ToIS might be tempted to 
claim that S could acquire independent justification for ruling out any error conjecture 
SH she might conceive of, for S would normally have a seeming that Not-SH is true or 
probable for any such SH. This line of response looks more promising than the former. I 
                                                            
24 Some of these authors claim that PC is problematic because it enables bootstrapping and 
epistemically circular reasoning. I doubt this is true. I think that a subject S couldn’t 
competently use inferences of these types to try to rule out error conjectures without 
falling prey to the problem of reflective awareness and thus losing her initial non-
inferential justification. So it appears true that PC doesn’t enable bootstrapping or 
epistemically circular reasoning.     
 21 
don’t find serious objections when SH stands for an ordinary error conjecture. Suppose 
S has a seeming that E supports P, where E and P are mathematical statements. Imagine 
that after becoming reflectively aware of this seeming, S conceives of an error 
conjecture SH stating that, say, her seeming is deceptive because she has inadvertently 
ingested a drug that hampers her mathematical reasoning. S would normally have some 
evidence E* (e.g., all justified beliefs of S about drugs, their effects and their 
availability) from which she could infer that Not-SH is probable. Accordingly, S would 
have an inferential seeming that Not-SH is probable in light of E*. Alternatively, it 
might happen that upon appraising SH, S would come to entertain a seeming that Not-
SH is probable without drawing any inference. Huemer (2016, 145, 158) acknowledges 
that phenomena of this type are psychologically possible and indeed quite ordinary; he 
describes them as cases of justificatory non-inferential dependence of S’s appearances 
on S’s background information B. S’s seeming that Not-SH is probable would in these 
cases be shaped by B, and the probability of Not-SH would be relative to B. Whether S 
had an inferential seeming that Not-SH is likely given E* or a seeming that Not-SH is 
likely (relative to B), S would have justification for ruling out SH. 
Unfortunately, this line of response becomes very problematic when SH is a 
sceptical conjecture (in the sense specified above), for in this case any seeming that S 
might attempt to use to rule out SH could be potentially explained by SH itself as a 
deceptive representation. Suppose for instance S has a seeming that E supports P. 
Imagine that after becoming reflectively aware of it, S conceives of a sceptical 
conjecture SH according to which her seeming is deceptive because it has been caused 
by a vicious demon that gets pleasure from secretly misleading S’s reasoning. If S also 
entertains an appearance––inferential or a non-inferential––that Not-SH is probable,25 S 
                                                            
25 For example, S might have an inferential appearance that Not-SH is probable in light of SH’s 
being far-fetched and overcomplicated, or a non-inferential appearance that Not-SH is 
probable relative to S’s scientific background information.    
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will have justification for ruling out SH. So far so good. The problem is this: since S is 
by assumption a reflective subject, it would be exceedingly easy for S to become 
reflectively aware of her seeming that Not-SH is probable and appreciate that this very 
seeming could be potentially explained by SH as a misleading representation induced by 
the demon to conceal its mischievous activity. This would destroy S’s justification for 
believing Not-SH and disbelieving SH depending on that seeming. Also note that once S 
appreciates that SH can potentially explain her seeming that Not-SH is probable as a 
deceptive state, it will be very easy for S to realize that any other appearance she might 
attempt to use to restore her justification for Not-SH could also be potentially explained 
by SH as a deceptive representation induced by the demon. This would disable the 
justifying power of all these appearances of S in one shot. Given these difficulties, this 
line of reply appears to me ultimately unviable. 
A way to settle the problems just described might be combining ToIS with some 
version of entitlement theory. Let me briefly explore this possibility. This brings us to 
the last line of response available to ToIS’s advocates that I will consider in this paper. 
Some epistemologists –– prominently, Wright (2007, 2007, 2014) –– maintain that there 
exists a type of epistemic justification –– called by Wright epistemic entitlement (or 
simply entitlement) –– for accepting the logical negation of any sceptical conjecture.26 
Justification of this type is not based on any evidence of the subject or acquired through 
any epistemic work made by the subject but it is possessed by all rational thinkers by 
default as a sort of epistemic right. Accordingly, possessing justification of this type 
doesn’t require the subject to entertain any sort of (perhaps deceptive) appearance. A 
quite similar view has been put forward by Michael Williams (1996). The thesis that we 
                                                            
26 Precisely, according to Wright, we are entitled to accept certain hinge propositions 
(cornerstones or presuppositions) inclusive of these logical negations. Sceptical 
conjectures are characterized by Wright as error or deception hypotheses such that the 
evidence in favour or against them can only be none or very little at best. 
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have epistemic entitlements seems to trace back to Thomas Reid’s Essays on the 
Intellectual Powers of Man (see Reid [1983]).  
To respond to the sceptic, advocates of ToIS might insist that S could have 
independent justification for ruling out any error conjecture SH she might conceive of. 
Precisely, they could argue that S would normally have a seeming that Not-SH is true or 
probable if SH were an ordinary error conjecture, and that S would be entitled to accept 
that Not-SH is true if SH were a sceptical conjecture. 
I think that this response to the sceptic would have more chance to succeed than 
the ones examined before. Wright’s entitlement theory –– which is probably the most 
developed view of this sort –– has attracted objections of various types. Possibly, the 
most recurrent criticism holds that what Wright calls entitlement isn’t a form of 
epistemic justification (cf. Pritchard [2005] and Jenkins [2007]). For a survey of 
objections see Wright (2014). Examining the critical literature on entitlement theory is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Let me only emphasize that Wright (2014) has made a 
good effort to address the major objections. For other rejoinders see for example 
Pedersen (2009) and Vahid (2017). 
7. Conclusion 
I have analyzed Huemer’s ToIS, according to which S’s possessing inferential 
justification requires S to entertain suitable inferential seemings. I have argued that, 
despite its important epistemological merits, ToIS is affected by a version of the 
problem of reflective awareness, which makes S’s inferential justification hostage to 
sceptical arguments requiring S to have independent justification for ruling out error 
conjectures. I have suggested that this problem might be surmounted if ToIS were 
combined with some version of entitlement theory.    
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